UP Police Regs 511Chapter 32 · Departmental Punishment of Police Officers and Their Criminal Prosecution
Section 511 · Paragraph 493. Superintendent of Police not permitted to re-investigate facts in dispute at judicial trial
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The Superintendent of Police shall not be permitted to examine, in a departmental inquiry against a police officer who has already been tried, the facts which were in dispute in the judicial trial, and the findings of the court on those facts shall be treated as final.
Thus: (a) If the accused is found guilty and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, no departmental inquiry shall be necessary, as the fact that he has been held liable for rigorous imprisonment shall be deemed to be a conclusive certificate of his unfitness to discharge his duties within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall, without further action, ordinarily pass an order of dismissal, obtaining, when necessary, the formal orders of the Deputy Inspector General under paragraph 479(a). If he wishes to do otherwise, he shall refer the matter to the Deputy Inspector General of the Range for orders.
(b) If the accused is found guilty but sentenced to a punishment less than rigorous imprisonment, a departmental inquiry shall be necessary if further action is considered desirable, provided the question in question is (1) whether the offence for which the accused is found guilty amounts to an offence under Section 7 of the Police Act; (2) if so, what punishment should be imposed. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall (i) call upon the accused to show cause why a specific penalty should not be imposed; (ii) without permitting the findings of the Court to be contested, record any submissions which the accused officer may make against such penalty; and (iii) record his findings and order in the ordinary manner, dealing with the submissions raised by the accused officer consistent with (1) and (2) above. (c) If the accused has been judicially acquitted or discharged and the time for filing an appeal has expired or an appeal has been filed, the Superintendent of Police shall reinstate him, if suspended. However, if the court's finding is not inconsistent with the view that the accused has been negligent or unfit to perform his duties within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act, the Superintendent of Police may refer the case to the Deputy Inspector General and seek permission to have the accused tried departmentally for negligence or unfitness.
Note
(1) Should every conviction be followed by dismissal? - Should a servant be dismissed after conviction in any case or for an offence involving moral turpitude as provided in this paragraph?
To decide whether an offence is involved in moral turpitude, it is necessary to consider: (1) whether the act punished was such as to offend the general moral sense of society; (2) whether the motive for the offence was low; and (3) whether the act led to the offender being considered of a depraved character or was thereby looked down upon by society. The determination of whether a particular act constitutes moral turpitude or not will not depend on the disciplinary authority's own satisfaction or discretion; it will have to be decided by considering the facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the offender's act. There will not be a different standard of morality applied to a member of a disciplinary organisation and indiscipline and immorality will not be on the same level as held in Ram Nagina Dubey vs. Commissioner of Police. Although the old Government Order No. 1618/Aath-295-52 of 1954 also requires that a sentence of rigorous imprisonment should result in dismissal, there may be a situation in which dismissal is not justified, at least where the offence is not accompanied by moral turpitude or where the officer has been punished in excess of his legal duty. This Regulation does not mention "combination of moral turpitude". (2) Departmental action after discharge from suit - When a police officer has been tried in a criminal court and acquitted, he shall not be punished by the department on the same charge or on another charge based on the evidence of a witness cited in the suit, unless-
(a) the criminal charge has failed for technical reasons, or
(b) in the opinion of the court or the Superintendent of Police, this has been due to the witness having turned hostile, or
(c) the court has found in its judgment that a crime was committed for which the police officer concerned is suspected; or
(d) the testimony given reveals facts unrelated to the charge and warrants departmental action on the other charge. or
(e) Additional admissible evidence is available for departmental proceedings.
(3) Doctrine of Estoppel Not Applicable - Where ammunition factory materials were found at the delinquent officer's home, but he was acquitted in a case under Section 411 of the CrPC, disciplinary proceedings could have been initiated against him for misbehavior. The charges in the departmental proceedings and the judicial hearing were not the same, so his acquittal would not be a bar to such proceedings. In Government of India v. Ramde, it was held that the doctrine of estoppel would not apply to acquittal for technical reasons, nor would granting the benefit of the doubt be considered a waiver of honor.
(4) Pathbreaking Decision - In Champak Lal v. J.B. Jhala, it was held that acquittal by a criminal court would not be a bar to the disciplinary authority's decision to initiate departmental proceedings against the delinquent officer, nor would it provide a theoretical cover to prevent such proceedings.
In Government of India vs. M.B. Patnaik, the Supreme Court held that where the order of demotion or termination of service is set aside on technical grounds or the servant is reinstated in compliance thereof, a second inquiry can be conducted on the facts and the said action will be legal and correct despite the technical order.
In Corporation Nagpur Nagar vs. Ramchandra, the Supreme Court, after the accused was honourably and completely acquitted of the charges, said that it would not be advisable to initiate departmental proceedings on the same charges or reasons or on the testimony, but the fact remains that merely due to such acquittal, the right of the concerned officer to take departmental action or his discretion towards it will not be barred.
Thus: (a) If the accused is found guilty and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, no departmental inquiry shall be necessary, as the fact that he has been held liable for rigorous imprisonment shall be deemed to be a conclusive certificate of his unfitness to discharge his duties within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall, without further action, ordinarily pass an order of dismissal, obtaining, when necessary, the formal orders of the Deputy Inspector General under paragraph 479(a). If he wishes to do otherwise, he shall refer the matter to the Deputy Inspector General of the Range for orders.
(b) If the accused is found guilty but sentenced to a punishment less than rigorous imprisonment, a departmental inquiry shall be necessary if further action is considered desirable, provided the question in question is (1) whether the offence for which the accused is found guilty amounts to an offence under Section 7 of the Police Act; (2) if so, what punishment should be imposed. In such cases, the Superintendent of Police shall (i) call upon the accused to show cause why a specific penalty should not be imposed; (ii) without permitting the findings of the Court to be contested, record any submissions which the accused officer may make against such penalty; and (iii) record his findings and order in the ordinary manner, dealing with the submissions raised by the accused officer consistent with (1) and (2) above. (c) If the accused has been judicially acquitted or discharged and the time for filing an appeal has expired or an appeal has been filed, the Superintendent of Police shall reinstate him, if suspended. However, if the court's finding is not inconsistent with the view that the accused has been negligent or unfit to perform his duties within the meaning of Section 7 of the Police Act, the Superintendent of Police may refer the case to the Deputy Inspector General and seek permission to have the accused tried departmentally for negligence or unfitness.
Note
(1) Should every conviction be followed by dismissal? - Should a servant be dismissed after conviction in any case or for an offence involving moral turpitude as provided in this paragraph?
To decide whether an offence is involved in moral turpitude, it is necessary to consider: (1) whether the act punished was such as to offend the general moral sense of society; (2) whether the motive for the offence was low; and (3) whether the act led to the offender being considered of a depraved character or was thereby looked down upon by society. The determination of whether a particular act constitutes moral turpitude or not will not depend on the disciplinary authority's own satisfaction or discretion; it will have to be decided by considering the facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the offender's act. There will not be a different standard of morality applied to a member of a disciplinary organisation and indiscipline and immorality will not be on the same level as held in Ram Nagina Dubey vs. Commissioner of Police. Although the old Government Order No. 1618/Aath-295-52 of 1954 also requires that a sentence of rigorous imprisonment should result in dismissal, there may be a situation in which dismissal is not justified, at least where the offence is not accompanied by moral turpitude or where the officer has been punished in excess of his legal duty. This Regulation does not mention "combination of moral turpitude". (2) Departmental action after discharge from suit - When a police officer has been tried in a criminal court and acquitted, he shall not be punished by the department on the same charge or on another charge based on the evidence of a witness cited in the suit, unless-
(a) the criminal charge has failed for technical reasons, or
(b) in the opinion of the court or the Superintendent of Police, this has been due to the witness having turned hostile, or
(c) the court has found in its judgment that a crime was committed for which the police officer concerned is suspected; or
(d) the testimony given reveals facts unrelated to the charge and warrants departmental action on the other charge. or
(e) Additional admissible evidence is available for departmental proceedings.
(3) Doctrine of Estoppel Not Applicable - Where ammunition factory materials were found at the delinquent officer's home, but he was acquitted in a case under Section 411 of the CrPC, disciplinary proceedings could have been initiated against him for misbehavior. The charges in the departmental proceedings and the judicial hearing were not the same, so his acquittal would not be a bar to such proceedings. In Government of India v. Ramde, it was held that the doctrine of estoppel would not apply to acquittal for technical reasons, nor would granting the benefit of the doubt be considered a waiver of honor.
(4) Pathbreaking Decision - In Champak Lal v. J.B. Jhala, it was held that acquittal by a criminal court would not be a bar to the disciplinary authority's decision to initiate departmental proceedings against the delinquent officer, nor would it provide a theoretical cover to prevent such proceedings.
In Government of India vs. M.B. Patnaik, the Supreme Court held that where the order of demotion or termination of service is set aside on technical grounds or the servant is reinstated in compliance thereof, a second inquiry can be conducted on the facts and the said action will be legal and correct despite the technical order.
In Corporation Nagpur Nagar vs. Ramchandra, the Supreme Court, after the accused was honourably and completely acquitted of the charges, said that it would not be advisable to initiate departmental proceedings on the same charges or reasons or on the testimony, but the fact remains that merely due to such acquittal, the right of the concerned officer to take departmental action or his discretion towards it will not be barred.
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